First Comprehensive Study On State Of Integrated Reporting In United States

IRRC Institute and the Sustainable Investments Institute – Monday, April 29, 2013

Every company in the S&P 500 except one reports some form of sustainability disclosure, but fewer quantify those disclosures in terms of bottom line impacts, according to a new report from the IRRC Institute (IRRCI) and the Sustainable Investments Institute (SI2). That report is the first to comprehensively benchmark the status of integrated reporting in the U.S.

New Study Says Multiclass Voting Companies Underperform, Riskier

IRRC Institute, ISS – Tuesday, October 2, 2012
A new study finds that controlled companies – particularly those with multiple classes of shares – generally underperform over the long term. As compared to companies with dispersed ownership, controlled companies experience more stock price volatility, increased material weakness in accounting controls, more related party transactions, and offer fewer rights to unaffiliated shareholders. The study results challenge the notion that multiclass voting structures benefit a company and its shareowners over the long term.

New Executive Compensation Research: Peer Group Benchmarking Inherently Flawed And Inflationary

IRRC Institute, The John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance – Saturday, September 22, 2012

An over-reliance on peer group compensation benchmarking is central to the persistent issue of rising executive pay in the United States, new research finds. While other research examines flawed peer group methodology, this new study makes it clear that peer grouping with minimal board discretion is a seriously flawed methodology even when the peer groups are fairly constructed. The study also is the first to document that peer group benchmarking – now so widely utilized that it is enshrined in federal regulations – has accidentally become the de facto standard even though it never was designed to determine CEO compensation.

The Election of Corporate Directors: What Happens When Shareowners Withhold a Majority of Votes from Director Nominees?

GMI Ratings, IRRC Institute – Thursday, August 16, 2012

In theory, the most significant corporate governance check and balance between public company shareowners and the company is the ability to elect corporate directors. In reality, that control mechanism is complicated and often compromised for a host of reasons. Nonetheless, there has been an increased focus on director elections in the past few years. This study examines what happens when shareowners withhold a majority of votes from a director nominee.

Environmental, Social and Governance Investing by College and University Endowments in the United States

IRRC Institute, Tellus Institute – Wednesday, July 18, 2012

With more than $400 billion in combined assets under management, US college and university endowments constitute an important segment of institutional investors involved in sustainable and responsible investing – defined here as the explicit incorporation of environmental, social and corporate-governance (ESG) issues into investment decision-making and active-ownership activities. This study provides one of the most comprehensive analyses to date of the state of ESG investing by educational endowments.

Voting Decisions at US Mutual Funds: How Investors Really Use Proxy Advisers

Richard Fields, Robyn Bew – Monday, June 4, 2012

A new report finds that proxy advisory firms clearly impact the corporate governance dialogue, but that mutual funds generally consider multiple factors in deciding how to vote. Additionally, voting outcomes do not fully explain the ways in which proxy firms influence multiple investor and corporate decision points, even outside of the voting season.