How IPO Prospectuses Shape Performance and Growth

How IPO Prospectuses Shape Performance and Growth

The Weinberg Center congratulates He Gao, Assistant Professor, Business Administration, on her latest publication in the Journal of Business Venturing Insights.

Her research and latest paper sheds light on how imagery-rich language in IPO prospectuses influences investor perception—and what that means for firm performance.

For new ventures, an IPO is a defining moment. To attract investors, firms often craft their messaging to appear as positive and persuasive as possible. But does this stylistic language reflect true potential—or just temporary hype?

Prof. Gao’s study examines the effects of linguistic strategies in IPO filings on both:

  • Short-term IPO performance

  • Post-IPO firm growth

Key Findings:

  • Imagery language generates greater investor enthusiasm, leading to higher IPO underpricing

  • However, it correlates with lower post-IPO growth, suggesting that early excitement may not signal lasting success

The study highlights the importance of critically evaluating rhetoric vs. reality in IPO materials—and offers new insights into how language shapes investment outcomes.


About Gao

Prof. Gao holds a Ph.D. in Strategic Management from Arizona State University. Her research focuses on competitive dynamics, strategic leadership, and the use of language by top executives to influence key stakeholders and rivals.

Her work has been published in leading journals, including:

  • Academy of Management Review

  • Journal of Management

  • Journal of Applied Psychology

  • Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings

Before joining the University of Delaware, she served on the faculty at Michigan State University.

Study, Mandatory Clawbacks May Add Firm Value

Study, Mandatory Clawbacks May Add Firm Value

More Exciting Scholarship from Professor Mahmud

The Weinberg Center is pleased to congratulate our distinguished Lerner College colleague, Hamed Mahmudi, on his latest paper, soon to be published in the Journal of Law and Economics, a leading publication from the University of Chicago. Hamed, a prolific and influential scholar, has made significant contributions to the study of corporate governance practices and debates.

In his latest, Hamed, along with co-authors Tor-Erik Bakke (University of Illinois) and Aazam Virani (University of Arizona), delves into the far-reaching implications of the SEC’s 2022 mandate requiring companies to adopt clawback provisions for executive compensation. This research rigorously examines how such provisions—designed to enable firms to recover performance-based compensation when financial misstatements occur—impact firm value and whether regulatory mandates of this nature benefit shareholders.

The study contributes to the ongoing debate over whether governance measures should be left to firms to decide (the “private ordering” view) or enforced through regulation (the “agency problem” view). This discussion is central to some of the most prominent voices in the field, including  scholars such as Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (Harvard), Sanjai Baghat (Colorado), Paul Gompers (Harvard), and David Larcker (Stanford).

Focusing on the SEC’s 2015 announcement of proposed rules under the Dodd-Frank Act—just prior to the 2022 mandate—this paper investigates how market participants responded to the uncertainty surrounding these provisions.

Key findings include:

  • Firms without a clawback provision in place before the SEC’s announcement saw a positive boost in firm value, with an average increase of $38.6 million, suggesting that mandatory clawbacks can enhance shareholder value.
  • The evidence indicates that firms most likely to benefit from mandatory clawbacks include those with powerful management and weak boards, higher CEO compensation tied to bonuses, and lower audit quality. On the other hand, high-growth firms with volatile cash flows or substantial R&D investments may be less likely to benefit, as such measures could reduce risk-taking or innovation.
  • Overall, these findings support the notion that governance regulations can increase firm value in certain cases. The study suggests that mandatory clawbacks could lead to better financial reporting and improve corporate governance.

For those interested in the broader debate around corporate governance and regulation, Professor Mahmudi’s study emphasizes the importance of not only considering voluntary governance reforms but also the role that regulatory measures can play in improving corporate practices for the benefit of investors and the broader economy.

Congratulations Hamed!

Read his other scholarly papers here.